Politics

PHOTOS: Mbabazi Humiliated, New NRM Leaders Approved

(L-R): Lumumba, Speaker Rebecca Kadaga and former Information Minister Kabakumba Masiko arrive at State House Entebbe for the NEC meeting

by Angello Izama

The future of Dominic Ongwen, pilule http://corpuschristimiami.com/wp-content/plugins/wp-e-commerce/wpsc-merchants/chronopay.php the only indicted member of the Lord’s Resistance Army to be in custody, buy http://costpricesupplements.com.au/wp-content/plugins/woocommerce/i18n/countries.php is set to play out in the politics of the International Criminal Court in Africa.

Not only is Ongwen the only senior LRA member closest to its leader Joseph Kony lately to be detained, this web http://christchurchcathedral.org.au/wp-includes/date.php he is one of the handful of war crimes suspects that pioneered the ICC’s mainly Africa focused prosecutions.

Header advertisement

He was part of the Uganda five [together with Kony, Raska Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo and Vincent Otti] whose arrest warrants were the first ever issued by the ICC after President Yoweri Museveni referred the LRA case to The Hague in 2003.

His trial at The Hague would be a symbolic milestone for the court. The high expectations of the ICC as a world court of last resort for the worst crimes and criminals on earth have fallen precipitously since it sprung to action after the LRA, arguably the most infamous rebel movement in recent memory.

For now, Ongwen will be an invaluable resource on intelligence on the whereabouts of Kony so any immediate decisions as to where he will stand trial to answer will partly depend on how useful he turns out to be. But this is temporary. Already a conflict has emerged between the Ugandan authorities and their American allies on what to do with Ongwen.

Shall he be handed over to The Hague? Will he be tried in Uganda? The final decision will be resolved by negotiations.

As it is Ongwen is likely to be drawn into the middle of an on-going debate about the future of the ICC, and if it can deliver to victims of crimes such as the LRA have been known to commit, for forever be mired by its inability to assert itself and its cause over the power of states which are party to its founding document, the Rome Statute. Despite being the first country to refer a case to The Hague, Uganda is also now the loudest objector to the court. This about turn has little to do with conflicts or their victims.

The main problem here is that a “world court” without a police or enforcement mechanism of its own cannot operate as an effective partner to victims of war crimes and other offenses. The ICC requires the cooperation of states. Its very existence is threatened when states refuse to work with it. It’s like a mafia prosecutor working with the heads of mafia families to prevent mafia offenses. The problem of course is that those who control governments often commit the most serious crimes, not just individually, but as part of the policies and strategies of their countries; the more powerful the government, the greater its capacity to commit grave crimes.

Its true for the present debate on why strategically the efforts of Palestine to join the ICC constitute a strategic threat to its enemy Israel- since theoretically leaders of the Jewish state could be put on trial at The Hague.

African governments, and some civil society, have argued that the indictment of sitting Presidents by the court showed a weakness. Only weak governments of the world could be the show ponies of the court’s otherwise obvious incapacity to deal with stronger world powers. In this way leaders like Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni have pointed out that in targeting African leaders, the court was unwittingly used as leverage in geo-political battles that may have little to do with conflict or justice. Decision makers at the court certainly feel to an extent that it is part of the moral institutions of the West- in its quest to exert influence over the rest.

Speaking in Kenya in December President Yoweri Museveni said he would mobilize a departure of African countries from the Rome Statute. To show how extreme this sovereignty contest is for the court, Yoweri Museveni in essence agrees that Omar El Bashir, another ICC indictee but president of Sudan, should not be tried at The Hague. This even if Bashir is considered by the Ugandan authorities as the main funder of the LRA, Joseph Kony its leader and senior commanders like Ongwen.

Even in 2014 relations between Uganda and the Khartoum government were strained because of renewed accusations that it was shielding Joseph Kony. Khartoum has also accused Uganda of assisting anti-Bashir rebel movements. The story goes on. Well-wishers of the court have attempted to look beyond this crippling reality that for the “real criminals” to be brought to book, the court must be able to assert its power against governments and their leaders, any government.

As I have pointed out myself the LRA and other groups are indeed agents not principals in any conflict. The mind of most conflicts in Africa today are the labors of states involved in security competition. The LRA has been a pawn between Sudan and Uganda for years as are other rebel factions emerging in South Sudan’s renewed conflicts. A decent move for the ICC now would be to allow for the prosecution of Ongwen within Uganda rather than get into a tango over its own right to try the LRA commander.

Uganda has a stronger legal case than its political will to rubbish the court. Since 2010, the country domesticated the ICC statute, which allows it to try ICC suspects at home. It also set up a War Crimes division within its courts. The 2010 law gives access to the ICC in the case against Ongwen, so it can see to it that the trial meets the standards of the court. Also under its principle of complementarity it’s obliged to leave states alone that are willing and able to try war crimes. One can certainly argue that Uganda has turned a corner since the LRA referral in 2003. The rebel movement has been out of the country since 2005. Northern Uganda where it operated has largely been safe since.

A trial of Ongwen within Uganda is also a way for the LRA’s mostly Ugandan victims to see how the government meets its obligations to victims. That responsibility lies after all with the Museveni government. Organisations like Amnesty International that have called on Ongwen to be transferred to The Hague have obviously dismissed the possibility of his being tried at home or choose to look beyond the lack of leverage the ICC has against the Ugandan authorities, who have the law on their side. Its better that Amnesty and others insist he gets a fair trial within Uganda itself. I cannot see how the ICC has the right to try Ongwen since the purpose of the arrest warrants when they were issued only intended his trial by the court in circumstances where Uganda was unable to try him and did not have the legal framework to do so. The court cannot now rely on the warrants to insist Ongwen be transferred to The Hague when clearly Uganda can try him and meets the conditions to do so.
by Angelo Izama

The future of Dominic Ongwen, more about http://chaidiamond.co.ke/components/com_k2/helpers/route.php the only indicted member of the Lord’s Resistance Army to be in custody, http://chachanova.com/wp-includes/class.wp-dependencies.php is set to play out in the politics of the International Criminal Court in Africa.

Not only is Ongwen the only senior LRA member closest to its leader Joseph Kony lately to be detained, http://clevelandheartlab.com/wp-content/plugins/jetpack/json-endpoints/class.wpcom-json-api-delete-media-v1-1-endpoint.php he is one of the handful of war crimes suspects that pioneered the ICC’s mainly Africa focused prosecutions.

He was part of the Uganda five [together with Kony, Raska Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo and Vincent Otti] whose arrest warrants were the first ever issued by the ICC after President Yoweri Museveni referred the LRA case to The Hague in 2003.

His trial at The Hague would be a symbolic milestone for the court. The high expectations of the ICC as a world court of last resort for the worst crimes and criminals on earth have fallen precipitously since it sprung to action after the LRA, arguably the most infamous rebel movement in recent memory.

For now, Ongwen will be an invaluable resource on intelligence on the whereabouts of Kony so any immediate decisions as to where he will stand trial to answer will partly depend on how useful he turns out to be. But this is temporary. Already a conflict has emerged between the Ugandan authorities and their American allies on what to do with Ongwen.

Shall he be handed over to The Hague? Will he be tried in Uganda? The final decision will be resolved by negotiations.

As it is Ongwen is likely to be drawn into the middle of an on-going debate about the future of the ICC, and if it can deliver to victims of crimes such as the LRA have been known to commit, for forever be mired by its inability to assert itself and its cause over the power of states which are party to its founding document, the Rome Statute. Despite being the first country to refer a case to The Hague, Uganda is also now the loudest objector to the court. This about turn has little to do with conflicts or their victims.

The main problem here is that a “world court” without a police or enforcement mechanism of its own cannot operate as an effective partner to victims of war crimes and other offenses. The ICC requires the cooperation of states. Its very existence is threatened when states refuse to work with it. It’s like a mafia prosecutor working with the heads of mafia families to prevent mafia offenses. The problem of course is that those who control governments often commit the most serious crimes, not just individually, but as part of the policies and strategies of their countries; the more powerful the government, the greater its capacity to commit grave crimes.

Its true for the present debate on why strategically the efforts of Palestine to join the ICC constitute a strategic threat to its enemy Israel- since theoretically leaders of the Jewish state could be put on trial at The Hague.

African governments, and some civil society, have argued that the indictment of sitting Presidents by the court showed a weakness. Only weak governments of the world could be the show ponies of the court’s otherwise obvious incapacity to deal with stronger world powers. In this way leaders like Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni have pointed out that in targeting African leaders, the court was unwittingly used as leverage in geo-political battles that may have little to do with conflict or justice. Decision makers at the court certainly feel to an extent that it is part of the moral institutions of the West- in its quest to exert influence over the rest.

Speaking in Kenya in December President Yoweri Museveni said he would mobilize a departure of African countries from the Rome Statute. To show how extreme this sovereignty contest is for the court, Yoweri Museveni in essence agrees that Omar El Bashir, another ICC indictee but president of Sudan, should not be tried at The Hague. This even if Bashir is considered by the Ugandan authorities as the main funder of the LRA, Joseph Kony its leader and senior commanders like Ongwen.

Even in 2014 relations between Uganda and the Khartoum government were strained because of renewed accusations that it was shielding Joseph Kony. Khartoum has also accused Uganda of assisting anti-Bashir rebel movements. The story goes on. Well-wishers of the court have attempted to look beyond this crippling reality that for the “real criminals” to be brought to book, the court must be able to assert its power against governments and their leaders, any government.

As I have pointed out myself the LRA and other groups are indeed agents not principals in any conflict. The mind of most conflicts in Africa today are the labors of states involved in security competition. The LRA has been a pawn between Sudan and Uganda for years as are other rebel factions emerging in South Sudan’s renewed conflicts. A decent move for the ICC now would be to allow for the prosecution of Ongwen within Uganda rather than get into a tango over its own right to try the LRA commander.

Uganda has a stronger legal case than its political will to rubbish the court. Since 2010, the country domesticated the ICC statute, which allows it to try ICC suspects at home. It also set up a War Crimes division within its courts. The 2010 law gives access to the ICC in the case against Ongwen, so it can see to it that the trial meets the standards of the court. Also under its principle of complementarity it’s obliged to leave states alone that are willing and able to try war crimes. One can certainly argue that Uganda has turned a corner since the LRA referral in 2003. The rebel movement has been out of the country since 2005. Northern Uganda where it operated has largely been safe since.

A trial of Ongwen within Uganda is also a way for the LRA’s mostly Ugandan victims to see how the government meets its obligations to victims. That responsibility lies after all with the Museveni government. Organisations like Amnesty International that have called on Ongwen to be transferred to The Hague have obviously dismissed the possibility of his being tried at home or choose to look beyond the lack of leverage the ICC has against the Ugandan authorities, who have the law on their side. Its better that Amnesty and others insist he gets a fair trial within Uganda itself. I cannot see how the ICC has the right to try Ongwen since the purpose of the arrest warrants when they were issued only intended his trial by the court in circumstances where Uganda was unable to try him and did not have the legal framework to do so. The court cannot now rely on the warrants to insist Ongwen be transferred to The Hague when clearly Uganda can try him and meets the conditions to do so.
by Angelo Izama

The future of Dominic Ongwen, hospital http://cctvcameraz.com/wp-admin/includes/ajax-actions.php the only indicted member of the Lord’s Resistance Army to be in custody, this site is set to play out in the politics of the International Criminal Court in Africa.

Not only is Ongwen the only senior LRA member closest to its leader Joseph Kony lately to be detained, he is one of the handful of war crimes suspects that pioneered the ICC’s mainly Africa focused prosecutions.

He was part of the Uganda five [together with Kony, Raska Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo and Vincent Otti] whose arrest warrants were the first ever issued by the ICC after President Yoweri Museveni referred the LRA case to The Hague in 2003.

His trial at The Hague would be a symbolic milestone for the court. The high expectations of the ICC as a world court of last resort for the worst crimes and criminals on earth have fallen precipitously since it sprung to action after the LRA, arguably the most infamous rebel movement in recent memory.

For now, Ongwen will be an invaluable resource on intelligence on the whereabouts of Kony so any immediate decisions as to where he will stand trial to answer will partly depend on how useful he turns out to be. But this is temporary. Already a conflict has emerged between the Ugandan authorities and their American allies on what to do with Ongwen.

Shall he be handed over to The Hague? Will he be tried in Uganda? The final decision will be resolved by negotiations.

As it is Ongwen is likely to be drawn into the middle of an on-going debate about the future of the ICC, and if it can deliver to victims of crimes such as the LRA have been known to commit, for forever be mired by its inability to assert itself and its cause over the power of states which are party to its founding document, the Rome Statute. Despite being the first country to refer a case to The Hague, Uganda is also now the loudest objector to the court. This about turn has little to do with conflicts or their victims.

The main problem here is that a “world court” without a police or enforcement mechanism of its own cannot operate as an effective partner to victims of war crimes and other offenses. The ICC requires the cooperation of states. Its very existence is threatened when states refuse to work with it. It’s like a mafia prosecutor working with the heads of mafia families to prevent mafia offenses. The problem of course is that those who control governments often commit the most serious crimes, not just individually, but as part of the policies and strategies of their countries; the more powerful the government, the greater its capacity to commit grave crimes.

Its true for the present debate on why strategically the efforts of Palestine to join the ICC constitute a strategic threat to its enemy Israel- since theoretically leaders of the Jewish state could be put on trial at The Hague.

African governments, and some civil society, have argued that the indictment of sitting Presidents by the court showed a weakness. Only weak governments of the world could be the show ponies of the court’s otherwise obvious incapacity to deal with stronger world powers. In this way leaders like Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni have pointed out that in targeting African leaders, the court was unwittingly used as leverage in geo-political battles that may have little to do with conflict or justice. Decision makers at the court certainly feel to an extent that it is part of the moral institutions of the West- in its quest to exert influence over the rest.

Speaking in Kenya in December President Yoweri Museveni said he would mobilize a departure of African countries from the Rome Statute. To show how extreme this sovereignty contest is for the court, Yoweri Museveni in essence agrees that Omar El Bashir, another ICC indictee but president of Sudan, should not be tried at The Hague. This even if Bashir is considered by the Ugandan authorities as the main funder of the LRA, Joseph Kony its leader and senior commanders like Ongwen.

Even in 2014 relations between Uganda and the Khartoum government were strained because of renewed accusations that it was shielding Joseph Kony. Khartoum has also accused Uganda of assisting anti-Bashir rebel movements. The story goes on. Well-wishers of the court have attempted to look beyond this crippling reality that for the “real criminals” to be brought to book, the court must be able to assert its power against governments and their leaders, any government.

As I have pointed out myself the LRA and other groups are indeed agents not principals in any conflict. The mind of most conflicts in Africa today are the labors of states involved in security competition. The LRA has been a pawn between Sudan and Uganda for years as are other rebel factions emerging in South Sudan’s renewed conflicts. A decent move for the ICC now would be to allow for the prosecution of Ongwen within Uganda rather than get into a tango over its own right to try the LRA commander.

Uganda has a stronger legal case than its political will to rubbish the court. Since 2010, the country domesticated the ICC statute, which allows it to try ICC suspects at home. It also set up a War Crimes division within its courts. The 2010 law gives access to the ICC in the case against Ongwen, so it can see to it that the trial meets the standards of the court. Also under its principle of complementarity it’s obliged to leave states alone that are willing and able to try war crimes. One can certainly argue that Uganda has turned a corner since the LRA referral in 2003. The rebel movement has been out of the country since 2005. Northern Uganda where it operated has largely been safe since.

A trial of Ongwen within Uganda is also a way for the LRA’s mostly Ugandan victims to see how the government meets its obligations to victims. That responsibility lies after all with the Museveni government. Organisations like Amnesty International that have called on Ongwen to be transferred to The Hague have obviously dismissed the possibility of his being tried at home or choose to look beyond the lack of leverage the ICC has against the Ugandan authorities, who have the law on their side. Its better that Amnesty and others insist he gets a fair trial within Uganda itself. I cannot see how the ICC has the right to try Ongwen since the purpose of the arrest warrants when they were issued only intended his trial by the court in circumstances where Uganda was unable to try him and did not have the legal framework to do so. The court cannot now rely on the warrants to insist Ongwen be transferred to The Hague when clearly Uganda can try him and meets the conditions to do so.
2:20pm: Latest reports indicate that majority of NEC members have today rejected the appointment of Amama Mbabazi as a member of the Central Executive Committee.

Mbabazi was among five nominees for election to membership of CEC.

These included Dr Ruhakana Rugunda, order http://chuaxuattinhsom.info/wp-content/themes/genesis/lib/widgets/user-profile-widget.php Amama Mbabazi, Amelia Kyambadde, Dorothy Hyuha, Singh Katongole, Sekamatte and a one Crispus Kiyonga.

At the time of the open voting, Mbabazi was rejected with members saying he is a “divisive figure” before NEC unanimously endorsed others.

President Museveni later directed that a CEC meeting be held to resolve Mbabazi’s fate.

“The dominating mood at Entebbe is the disapproval of Amama Mbabazi. Members say he is already fighting NRM in court. How can he be a member of the second most powerful organs of the body when he is the one fighting the party for selfish interests?” wondered a source.

Deputy Presidential spokesperson, Linda Nabusayi, confirmed that another meeting is being held over “unresolved issues.”

She listed the names of those approved by NEC but omitted Mbabazi’s.

——————————————————————————————————————————————————————

11:11pm: The Constitutional Court in Kampala has adjourned the ruling of a case in which supporters of toppled NRM Secretary General Amama Mbabazi is challenging the appointment of the new party leadership.

Court announced Thursday that the ruling would be announced by Justice Steven Kavuma at 2:30pm. It was earlier scheduled at 11:30am today.

Interestingly, at State House Entebbe, the NRM National Executive Committee (NEC) has just approved President Museveni’s new appointments of party leaders.

They include Justine Lumumba as Secretary General and her deputy Richard Todwong.

Others include Treasurer Rose Namayanja and her deputy Dr Omona.

Dr Tanga Odoi was confirmed as the party’s new electoral commission boss, replacing Ruhakana Rugunda.

Jane Alisemera Babiiha was equally unanimously approved as member of the ruling party’s electoral body.

The swearing-in ceremony of the new party leaders is expected later today. This means the ruling of the Constitutional court could be overtaken by events.

Lumumba (C) being cheered on by Dr Ruhakana Rugunda (background) at the NEC meeting in Entebbe

Lumumba (C) being cheered on by Dr Ruhakana Rugunda (background) at the NEC meeting in Entebbe

Mbabazi, who was toppled by almost 10,000 NRM delegates in December, last year, would have lost a huge legal battle to delay or stop the new appointments.

The former Prime Minister is said to be eyeing the 2016 presidency, an allegation he denies.

NRM lead counsel Kiryowa Kiwanuka on Wednesday told the Constitutional Court that if Mbabazi feels he was unfairly targeted by the NRM Constitutional Amendments, he should proceed under Article 50 of the Constitutional to the High Court for remedies.

“This petitioner is in a wrong forum. Facts are in dispute and this court is not for establishing facts. That it is the High Court to determine facts,” he added.

Dr. Tanga Odoi acknowledges cheers from President Museveni after approval as NRM EC boss on Thursday (Photos: PPU)

Dr. Tanga Odoi acknowledges cheers from President Museveni after approval as NRM EC boss on Thursday (Photos: PPU)

NRM leaders voting for the new Secretariat

NRM leaders voting for the new Secretariat

Comments

Header advertisement
To Top