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How Kiir – Machar 6-year Communication Breakdown Sparked off South Sudan War

State Minister of public service in charge of pensions Prisca Ssezi Mbaguta was among the unlucky incumbents in yesterday’s NRM primaries, visit this http://ciudad-deporte.com/wp-admin/includes/credits.php losing her party flag for the Rukungiri Woman Member of Parliament seat to Winfred Matsiko.

Mbaguta defeated Matsiko in the previous 2010 ruling NRM primaries in a highly contested race.

Elidio Byaryengoma, viagra the Rukungiri district NRM registrar declared Matsiko’s victory at 11.40 am at the Rukungiri district council hall, decease having polled 46,691 and her rival Prisca Mbaguta 36345 votes.

Minister Priska Seezi Mbaguta

Minister Priska Seezi Mbaguta

In other results in the district, the Rukungiri district LC5 boss Charles Kwebangira Byabakama lost the flag to Anderson Katebire; polling 34,315 to 42,118.

Mary Paula Turyahikayo retained the Rubabo county MP flag, defeating former Makerere university chancellor Prof. Mondo Kagonyera.

Rtd. Major General Jim Muhwezi Katugugu the minister of information and national guidance retained his seat as the Rujumbura County flag bearer after defeating Julius Muhurizi.

 
Before the alleged December 2013 coup in South Sudan, advice http://danielpyne.com/wp-content/themes/twentytwelve/page-templates/full-width.php the relationship between President Gen Salva Kiir and his Vice President, visit Dr Riek Machar was too broken to an extent that many thought there were two parallel governments in the country, details of a new investigation have revealed.

At that time, according to the African Union Final Investigation Report on War Crimes In South Sudan, there  were “indications  as  early  as  2009  that  “all  was  not  well,  and  that  differences within  the  party  portended  violence.”

The Commission established that long before the 2010 elections, the relationship between the two leaders was already strained, and that these differences were overlooked for the sake of unity  within the  party  during the Interim Period (2005-2011).

It is was suggested that the SPLM split in 1991, and the  reordering  of  the SPLM  leadership  to accommodate  Riek  Machar  on  his  return were partly to blame for the frosty relationship that carried on into government after independence.

In 2010, the two leaders are said to have supported rival candidates in  a  number  of  key  electoral  positions,  particularly  the  governorships  of  several states thus hurting the already strained relations.

Respondents described to the Commission a difficult working relationship, and that throughout  the  interim  period  and  after independence,  “there  had  been  no  direct communication  between  the  Office of  the  President  and  that of  the  Vice President, with each cultivating other relationships and working directly with other government officials.”

While it was earlier thought that Machar and Kiir simply disagreed on the preparations for presidential elections hence the violence, the latest report shows it was much more than meets the eye.

At first, it was established that following a bitter quarrel in the meeting of senior party leaders, Machar’s supporters moved in to take power.

However, the African Union report cited a senior government official who served with both leaders giving an insight into the terrible relations between Kiir and Machar.

“There was no file moving from OP (Office of the President) to Vice President’s Office and vice versa,” said the unnamed official.

Investigators concluded that for  some time,  there  were  two  parallel  governments,  and  that  the political  differences  within  the  SPLM  merely  accentuated  the  factionalism  revolving around the two leaders.

In this regard, one respondent narrated: “…The President was there busy with his own goal to reach the referendum and the Vice  President  was  given  all  the  powers  but  he  was  setting [working with] his own people who were affiliated to him … in all ministries and we can see the soundness [implications] of what was going on.”

The Commission was tasked to investigate  the  human  rights  violations  and  other  abuses  committed  during the  armed  conflict  in  South  Sudan  and  make  recommendations  on  the  best ways  and  means  to  ensure  accountability,  reconciliation  and  healing  among all South Sudanese communities.

The Commission also heard that conflicts emerged within the SPLM in 2009 as Southern Sudan prepared to hold elections in 2010.

At the  time,  differences  between  the  President  and  Pagan  Amum,  the  then  Secretary General  of  the  SPLM  had  threatened  to  derail  progress  towards elections.

The differences  were  eventually  resolved,  with  many  urging  for  unity  of  purpose  as  the elections and the eventual referendum approached.

Perhaps  the  strongest  signal  that  the  situation  could  deteriorate  into  violent confrontation was the developments in political circles, according to the report.

“The dismissal of the Cabinet in  July  2013,  heightened  tensions  and  fostered  a  sense  of  exclusion  in  sections  of South  Sudanese  society,” said the investigators in their final report seen by ChimpReports.

The  Commission  heard  from  many  respondents  that following  this  event,  and  in  the  lead  up  to the  SPLM  meetings  held  in  December, there  were  rumours  around  Juba  “that  the  Dinka  and  Nuer  are  going  to  fight”, pointing to deteriorating security situation around the capital.

Recruitment

Respondents also noted that the recruitment exercise carried out by the army added to  the  suspicion  and  tension  that  was  building  up  in  political  circles.

Figures   ranged   from   7,500   to   15,000.   The Commission  heard  further  that  the  recruitment  was  conducted  mainly  from  Bahr  el Ghazal by the then Governor of Northern Bahr el Ghazal Paul Malong as a response to  the  build  up  of  tensions  with  Sudan  over  Heglig.

The President confirmed that 7500 were recruited. A  majority  of  the  newly  trained  soldiers  were  not  regularly integrated  into  the  SPLA, according to the report.

According  to  officials,  between  330  and  700  of  these soldiers were eventually integrated into the Tiger Unit (Presidential Guard) following a  commissioning  ceremony  attended  by  President.

It was not clear, from the Commission’s consultations, what happened to the rest of the newly trained recruits.

However, the  Commission  heard  that  some  of  these  were  deployed  around  Juba disguised as ‘street cleaners’ in the weeks leading up to December 15.

Contestation over this exercise arose as early as May 2013.  Top  military  leaders interviewed  by  the  Commission  had  voiced  concern  that  the  exercise  was  skewed and  irregular.

Some concerns were raised about the composition of the new force. The   Commission   learnt   that   the   new   recruits   essentially   operated   outside established military command.

The  President  and  former  military  leaders  told  the Commission that due to budgetary constraints, alternative arrangements were made (from private sources) to train, provide kits and pay the salaries of the new recruits.

Leadership

Other respondents point to structural and institutional factors, rather than the events unfolding in the political scene.

In this regard, one senior SPLM official observed that the  structural  weakness  of  the  state  and  the  ruling  party  provided  the  optimal conditions for the political conflicts to flourish, leading to the outbreak of violence:

Many  South  Sudanese  as  well  as  regional  leaders  told  the  Commission  that  the current  crisis  in  South  Sudan  is  partly  a  crisis  of  leadership,  and  that  had  those  in positions of power —both within the SPLM and government —acted decisively, it is likely  that  the  contestation  within  the  party  would  have  been  resolved  through democratic means.

The violent confrontation that broke out within the military could have been arrested before it got out of hand, according to the Commission.

One  regional  leader  observed that  the  indecision  of  leaders  can  be  attributed  to  the  conflation  of  personal, communal  and  national  interests.

With  respect  to  the  lack  of  leadership,  one respondent observed that: “So  all  the  other  things  that  happened,  practically  were  based  on political failure leadership because it was something that can be solved within the political party but they allowed it and I think there were clear indicators that the leadership is not going on well. There were quarrels among them … a lot of confusion was going on.”

On the   reason why   the   conflict   spread   from   the   party,   into   the   army   and subsequently the general population, many respondents pointed to the structural links between the SPLA and the SPLM.

A  survey  commissioned  by  the  government concluded that the government had failed on multiple fronts, and that there appeared to  be  widespread dissatisfaction  with  its  performance  in  the  general  population.

As the party prepared to establish new structures, and to renew itself in preparation for future  elections,  the  findings  of  the  survey  begun  to  feature  in  the  jockeying  within the  party.

Power struggle

Echoing views expressed by several respondents, an opposition leader has suggested that the conflict within the SPLM was essentially about power: […] this is why I said the difference has nothing to do with reform … Riek [Machar] wanted to be Chairman, Rebecca Nyandeng’ wanted to be the Chairperson,  Pagan  [Amum]  wanted  to  be  Chairman  and  Salva  [Kiir] wanted to continue. That was the problem.”

On Thursday, we will reveal how the war in Juba started….

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